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The 2000 NPT Review Conference and Nuclear Disarmament
Mitsuru Kurosawa*
  The 2000 NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) Review 
Conference was held at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York from 
April 24 to May 20, and the Conference adopted afinal document by consensus. At 
the Conference, all issues concerning nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation were discussed. Although we can say that the Conference was prima 
facie successful') because it could adopt the final document, the document was a 
result of many compromises after pierce discussions during four weeks, and we 
need precise examination to know whether the conference played enough its role to 
promote nuclear disarmament. 
  This article will follow the discussions at the Conference focusing on nuclear 
disarmament, make it clear what measures were agreed, and examine what 
meanings these agreed measures have. For these purposes, at first I will touch upon 
the background of the Conference, the circumstances when the Conference started, 
and the structure and proceedings of the Conference. Then, I will show what kind 
of arguments key players of the Conference brought forward. Thirdly, I will 
precisely examine what kind of measures were agreed in the final document in 
connection with the measures which should be taken in coming five years as well as 
the review of last five years. I will also take up the issues of negative security
* Professor of International Law and Relations, Osaka School of International Public Policy and Graduate 
   School of Law, Osaka University. 
I) Mr. Abdallah Baali, the President of the Conference, explained the reasons for the success of the 
   Conference as follows: 1) the preparation and the resolution of some of the NPT Conference problems 
   before the Conference started, 2) the very strict time management measures taken as well as the respect 
   for the program of work and the various deadlines, 3) the Joint Statement of the 5 NWS which included 
   the issue of NMD-ABM Treaty, 4) the ratification by the Russian Duma of START II and the CTBT, 
   and 5) the pragmatic and realistic attitude adopted by the key players. (Abdallah Baali, "2000 NPT 
   Review Conference: Succeeding against all odds. What is next?" International Symposium and 
   Lectures, Expanding the Nuclear Free Umbrella, August 4, 2000, Hiroshima.) Ambassador Seiichiro 
   Noboru of Japanese delegation analyzed that: "it is recalled that the Conference at last managed to 
   succeed to agree on a final document after many concessions as a compromise because participating 
   states had deep concern over negative influence in the case that the Conference failed." (Seiichiro 
   Noboru, "Reflecting upon the 2000 NPT Review Conference," Gaiko Forum, September 2000, p.34. (in 
  Japanese)) 1
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assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as the issue of strengthening the 
non-proliferation regime. Finally, based on the outcome of the Conference, I will 
try to show how the future of nuclear disarmament takes shape. 2)
I. Background of the NPT Review Conference
  The purpose of the review conference is to review the operation of this Treaty 
with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the 
Treaty are being realized, and it has been held every five years. The central 
purpose of the Treaty is non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the Treaty also 
deals with nuclear disarmament, security assurances, safeguards, nuclear-weapon-
free zones, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The review of the operation of the 
Treaty includes all issues mentioned above. 
  However, as is clear from the negotiation process of the Treaty, the most 
important aspect is whether the nuclear-weapon states have pursued negotiations in 
good faith on nuclear disarmament under the Article VI. The Treaty was agreed on 
the presumption that it was necessary to prevent the further proliferation for future 
nuclear disarmament, and many non-nuclear-weapon states became parties based 
on that presumption in spite of the fact that the Treaty is discriminatory in nature. 
  The discriminatory nature of the Treaty was also reflected conversely in the 
provision of its duration. Although the draft treaty submitted by the United States 
and the Soviet Union provided that the duration is unlimited, the final version of the 
Treaty stipulates that it has 25 years duration provisionally and a conference then 
will decide how long to extend the duration. 3) The 1995 NPT Review and 
Extension Conference decided to extend the duration of the Treaty indefinitely. 
  The 2000 Review Conference was thought to be important, because it is the first 
since the Treaty was extended indefinitely. As the Treaty was extended 
indefinitely, the non-nuclear-weapon states found themselves loosing their 
bargaining chips, and they were afraid that the progress in nuclear disarmament 
would not be expected without the constructive cooperation from the nuclear-
weapon states.
2) This paper does not necessarily deal with all issues discussed at the Conference. The issues such as 
   safeguards, export control, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance, regional issues and 
   strengthening the review process of the Treaty are not examined in this paper. 
3) On the negotiation process of the Treaty, see Mitsuru Kurosawa, International Disarmament Law: A 
   New Framework: A Study of'the Regime for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Yushindo, Tokyo, 
   1986. (in Japanese)
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  The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference adopted two documents asa 
package with its extension decision. One is the decision on "Strengthening the 
Review Process for the Treaty" and the other is "Principles and Objectives for 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament". These two documents were adopted 
to establish a mechanism to evaluate continuously and concretely the progress in 
nuclear disarmament even after the Treaty was extended indefinitely. Under the 
former, a review conference should be held every five years, its preparatory 
committee should be held for ten days every year in the three years before the 
conference, the preparatory committee can recommend not only on procedural 
matters but also on substantive matters, and preparatory committee can establish 
subsidiary bodies to focus on specific issues. The latter lists the concrete nuclear 
disarmament measures that should be taken in coming five years, shows the 
direction that we should go, and provides the benchmark through which the 
progress hould be measured.4) 
  The preparatory committees of the 2000 Review. Conference were held for ten 
days each in 1997, 1998 and 1999. They discussed substantive matters as well as 
procedural matters, but they could not agree on the recommendation  substantive 
matters to the Review Conference. Because of this failure, there existed general 
feeling of disappointment with the new system and pessimistic prospect for the 
2000 NPT Review Conference. 
  This general negative feeling was a reflection of international atmosphere during 
last five years, when there was strong head wind blowing against nuclear 
disarmament. Among the measures provided for in the Principles and Objectives, 
the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) was adopted in September 
1996, no negotiations on a FMCT (fissile material cut-off treaty) has begun, and no 
progress in nuclear disarmament has been seen. The START process stalled and 
the U.S. Senate rejected the ratification of the CTBT. In May 1998, India and 
Pakistan conducted underground nuclear tests, challenging the international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. These tests do not violate any legal obligations, because 
they are not parties to the NPT. Although their tests do not directly violate any 
treaty provisions, they impair the international nuclear non-proliferation regime that 
is supported by overwhelming members of international society, ant challenge the
4) On the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, see Mitsuru Kurosawa, "New Development of 
   Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Extension of the NPT and Future Prospect," Hunan Rights and 
   Humanity in International Law: A New Horizon, Toshindo, Tokyo, forthcoming, (in Japanese) and 
   Mitsuru Kurosawa, "On the Indefinite Extension of the NPT," Energy Review, September 1995, pp.40-
   42. (in Japanese)
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legitimacy of the NPT. 
  The pessimistic prospect of the Conference, in a wider sense, depended on the 
general deterioration of international security environment. The relation between 
the U.S. and Russia became much worse, because of NATO's expansion eastward 
and NATO's air bombings of Kosovo, and also the development by the U.S. of 
TMD (Theater Missile Defense) and NMD (National Missile Defense). The 
relation between the U.S. and China has been deteriorating too. 5)
II. Proceedings and Characteristics of the Conference
1. Beginning of the Conference 
  The Conference, which was held under the pessimistic atmosphere mentioned 
above, made a good start. One of the reasons is that Russian Duma, that had been 
refusing the ratification of the START II Treaty for a long time, approved the 
ratification just ten days before the first day of the Conference, and Duma also 
approved the ratification of the CTBT three days before that day. These events, 
representing Russia's peace offensive, radically changed the international 
atmosphere surrounding the Conference, and played an extremely important role as 
the departing point for successful Conference. 
  The other reason is that the Conference managed to decide the establishment of 
two subsidiary bodies on the first day of the Conference. On the one hand, South 
Africa and other non-aligned countries had been asking to establish a subsidiary 
body on nuclear disarmament, and Egypt and other Arab states had been asking to 
establish a subsidiary body on the Middle East. On the other hand, the U.S. had 
strongly opposed to these demands. It was afraid that the first several days would 
be wasted because of the disagreement on the establishment of subsidiary bodies. 
  The two subsidiary bodies were established ue to the President's constructive 
efforts prior to the Conference and compromises by the U.S. and Egypt. Egypt 
originally demanded a subsidiary body on the Middle East, but the Conference 
agreed to establish a subsidiary body on regional issues, including the Middle East. 
  On the first day, Ambassador Abdallah Baali of Algeria was elected as a
5) On the prospect of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, see Mitsuru Kurosawa, "Toward the 2000 NPT 
   Review Conference," Osaka University Law Review, No.47, February 2000, pp. 1-15; Emily Bailey and 
   John Simpson, "Issues and Options for the 2000 NPT Review Conference," PPNN Issue Review, No.17, 
   April 2000, 8p; Rebecca Johnson, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Challenging Times, Acronym 13, February 
   2000; Tariq Lauf, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference," Non-Proliferation Review, Vol.7,No.l, Spring 
   2000, pp.146-161; Lawrence Scheinman, "Politics and Pragmatism: The Challenges for NPT 2000," 
   Arms Control Today, Vol.30,No.3, April 2000, pp. 18-23.
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President. Mr. Jacky Selebi of South Africa, who was a president of Oslo 
Conference for adopting Convention banning anti-personal landmines and got a 
high reputation as a president, was initially supposed to be a president of the 2000 
NPT Review Conference. Mr. Baali was unknown person in the field of 
disarmament and his ability of the presidency was not known. From this point, 
some were pessimistic about the possible result of the Conference. Contrary to 
these concerns, Mr. Baali in fact did a good job and led the Conference to the 
successful adoption of the final document. His ability to deal with the proceedings 
of the conference should be highly praised, and his ability should be evaluated as 
one element of the Conference success. 
  The President in his statement mentioned positive and negative developments in
the past five years. As the negative elements, he listed nuclear tests by India and 
Pakistan, the lack of universality of the NPT, the refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify 
the CTBT, the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament between Russia and the 
U.S., the new nuclear strategies of NATO and Russia, the challenge to the ABM 
Treaty and the intention of the U.S. to deploy an anti-missile defense system, the 
impasse in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the existence of 30,000 
nuclear weapons. 
  As the positive development, he listed the ratification of the START II by the 
Russian Parliament, the increase of the NPT parties to 187, the strengthening of the 
IAEA safeguards by adopting the model additional protocol, the unilateral measures 
to reduce nuclear weapons and introduce greater transparency, the establishment of
nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia and efforts to 
denuclearize in Central Asia, and opening for signature of the CTBT. Then he said 
that the outcome of this Conference would have a major impact on deciding the 
future course of the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime for generation to 
come. He also mentioned the important role of civil society, and said that we 
should strive to bridge our differences and approach the Conference with a 
determination tofind a common agreement on realistic measures. 6)
  The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan emphasized that 
we faced major challenges in fulfilling the disarmament aims of the NPT. He 
referred to some 35,000 nuclear weapons remained in the arsenals of the nuclear 
powers, with thousands till deployed on hair-trigger alert. There have been no 
nuclear disarmament negotiations for many years. We have witnessed the re-
6) Statement by the President of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
   Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, H.E. Ambassador Abdallah Baali (Algeria), New York, April 24, 
  2000.
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affirmation of the nuclear weapons doctrines of all the nuclear-weapon states. As 
the most recent challenge, he mentioned the growing pressure to deploy national 
missile defenses. 
  As benchmarks for future progress, he mentioned the entry into force of the 
CTBT, deep, irreversible reduction in stocks of nuclear weapons, the consolidation 
of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and negotiation of new zones, binding 
security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states parties, and improvements in the 
transparency ofnuclear weapons arsenals and nuclear materials. 7) 
2. Main Players in the Conference 
  Compared with thelast five review conferences, the 2000 Review Conference 
was significantly different in main players. Traditionally, the multilateral 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament have been among three groups, that is, 
western group, eastern group and non-aligned group, as is shown in the Conference 
on Disarmament in Geneva. However, with the end of the Cold War, there has 
been a tendency that the eastern group has been absorbed in the western group, and 
the non-aligned group can not unite themselves as before. On non-proliferation, the 
confrontation has been traditionally between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-
nuclear-weapon states. 
  One of the characteristics of the 2000 Review Conference is that the New 
Agenda Coalition (NAC) played a very important role in place of the Non-Aligned 
Movement Countries (NAM). The NAC consists of seven states, that is, Ireland, 
Sweden and New Zealand which are not included in the NAM, and Brazil, Egypt, 
Mexico and South Africa which are members of the NAM. The five nuclear-
weapon states (N-5) are the subject to conduct nuclear disarmament, and their 
importance in nuclear negotiation is the same as before. The counterpart of the N-5 
was the NAC and not the NAM at the Conference. The NAC, which was 
established in June 1998 by the states of great concern to nuclear disarmament, 
takes more realistic position than the NAM. 
  The other characteristic of the Conference was the emergence of intermediary 
group of states, which searched for the compromise between the N-5 and the NAC. 
Japan and Australia submitted working papers and actively played their role. The 
NATO-5 group, consisting of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and 
Norway also played an important role. Canada played a role too. These 
intermediary states were active in submitting working papers and discussing the
7) The Secretary-General Address to the NPT 2000 Review Conference, New York, 24 April 2000.
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final document and played a role in successfully adopting the final document. 
3. Structure of the Conference 
  The Conference started on the 24th of April, and in the morning session the 
statements by the President, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the 
Director-General of the IAEA were read out. General Debates began in the 
afternoon on the same day and continued until the first part of the second week. 
Altogether 93 delegations of states parties made statement, explaining their own 
position on various issues. Precise discussions have been taken place in three Main 
Committees. The Main Committee I dealt with nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear 
disarmament and security assurances, the Main Committee II dealt with safeguards, 
nuclear-weapon-free zones and other issues, and the Main Committee III dealt with 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The review conferences in 1990 and 1995 
succeeded to adopt draft final documents in Main Committees II and III, but Main 
Committee I failed to adopt it, and as a result, the conference as a whole failed to 
adopt a final document. Based on the past experiences, the debate at the Main 
Committee I at this Conference attracted attention. 
  At this Conference, structure is a little different from previous ones, because 
Subsidiary Body I on nuclear disarmament was established under the Main 
Committee I and Subsidiary Body II was established under the Main Committee II. 
The subsidiary bodies were established to provide for a focused consideration of 
specific issues. However, the discussion time for subsidiary bodies was not 
allocated in addition to the time allocated to the Main Committees, but within the 
time allocated to the Main Committees. As a result, the whole time originally 
allocated to the Main Committee and the time in fact allocated to the Main 
Committee and to the Subsidiary Body were the same, and the time for whole 
meetings was not increased. Although different Main Committees were held 
simultaneously, the Main Committee and its Subsidiary Body were not held 
simultaneously. In effect, the Main Committee and its Subsidiary Body worked as 
one negotiating body on different issues. The decision on this point in the 1995 
document is not clear, and some scholars suggested a possibility that a subsidiary 
body would discuss a particular issue in addition to ordinary discussion in the main 
committee. In reality, as there were so many informal consultations in addition to 
the planned program of time, we can say that additional negotiations were held in 
the Subsidiary Bodies.
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4. Proceedings of the Discussion 
  The discussion in each of three Main Committees tarted at the end of the first 
week, and in the second week the five nuclear-weapon states submitted their 
common statement and the discussions in two Subsidiary Bodies started. At the 
end of the second week, the chairman's working paper of the Main Committee I
and the chairman's working paper on cluster 1 of the Subsidiary Body I were 
submitted. In the third week, the discussions were hot and precise, and informal 
consultations began which sometimes lasted by mid-night. The discussions and 
negotiations were continued based on the chairman's working papers, and through 
the discussions the chairman's working papers were revised. At the end of the third 
week, as was required by the President, the reports of the three Main Committees 
including the report of the Subsidiary Bodies were submitted at the plenary 
meeting. 
  In the fourth week, all meetings were informal consultations, and each Main 
Committee and Subsidiary Body worked hard to make a draft final document. 
President Baali sometimes took initiative for informal consultations.8) The three 
Main Committees and the two Subsidiary Bodies continued to make a draft paper, 
and at the plenary meeting under the President's chairmanship, "Improving the 
effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty" was discussed. At 
the final stage, these six draft documents were arranged into one document in 
accordance with the paragraphs of the Treaty. The most difficult issues which 
remained unresolved until the end of the Conference were "unequivocal 
undertaking to total elimination of nuclear arsenals", "nuclear transparency" and 
"Iraqi issue".
III. Arguments by Key States
1. Arguments by the Nuclear-Weapon States 
  On the first and second days of the Conference, all nuclear-weapon states made 
statements, explaining their each position on several important issues. The general 
contents of these statements expressed that they made their best efforts for nuclear 
disarmament, fulfilling their obligation under the Article VI. However, it became
8) The President Baali nominated thirty-some states for informal consultations when he started informal 
   consultation. However, the states which were not included in it protested the nomination strongly. As a 
   result, he was obliged to change it as open-ended. The President once started to pick up paragraphs 
   which concerned with future actions from the chairman's working papers which included both forward-
   looking and backward-looking paragraphs, but he abandoned this work.
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clear from these statements that there existed big difference of opinions on critical 
matters among the five nuclear-weapon states. 
  The United States highly evaluated the decision of five years ago on indefinite 
extension of the Treaty. On the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Secretary of 
State M. Aibright said that there was no provision in the Treaty for new nuclear 
weapon states, nor would there be one. The U.S. emphasized that "we have already 
made remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament", and "the U.S. is meeting its 
commitment to Article VI," by referring to the progress in START II and START 
III, the cooperative threat reduction program with Russia, and the reduction of the 
number of nuclear weapons within NATO. 
  On missile defense, she said that "The world has changed dramatically in the 
almost three decades since the ABM Treaty was signed. That Treaty has been 
amended before, and there is no good reason it cannot be amended again to reflect 
new threats from third countries outside the strategic deterrence regime. And 
please remember that we are talking about a system capable of defending against at 
most a few tens of incoming missiles. It is not intended to degrade Russia's 
deterrent. Nor will it have that result." 
  On the CTBT, the ratification of which was recently refused by the Senate, she 
made it clear that the United States would not resume testing, and its work and 
support for the Treaty's Preparatory Commission have continued. She was 
convinced that America would ratify the CTBT. As a caveat to the NAC and the 
NAM, she said "if countries demand unrealistic and premature measures, they will 
harm the NPT and set back everyone's cause,"9) 
  Russia emphasized that "A tendency to undermine the existing system of 
strategic stability and the attempts to build national stability at the expense of the 
interest of other states is dangerous. This is, in fact, a direct invitation to a new 
arms race on the planet." Russia criticized the U.S. plan to deploy a National ABM 
system based on the arguments that "Further reductions in strategic offensive 
weapons can only be considered in the context of preservation of the ABM Treaty. 
...The collapse of the ABM Treaty would, therefore, undermine the entirety of 
disarmament agreements concluded over the last 30 years." 
  Russia said that it was fully committed to its obligations under Article VI of the 
Treaty and as its evidence listed the ratification of the START II Treaty and the 
1997 package of ABM agreements, the ratification of the CTBT, and the unilateral
9) Remarks, Secretary of States, Madeleine Albright, to the Opening Session of the United Nations Non-
   Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2000, General Assembly Hall, United Nations Headquarters, 
  New York, New York, April 24,2000; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.3, 2 May 2000.
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deep reduction of its tactical nuclear weapons. On the START process, Russia is 
prepared to consider reducing nuclear arsenals of the Parties to the level of 1500 
warheads.10) 
  The United Kingdom said that the NMD issue should be addressed bilaterally 
with the Russians, but added that the United Kingdom have made it clear to both 
sides that we continue to value the ABM Treaty and wish to see it preserved. The 
U.K. emphasized its efforts for nuclear disarmament, mentioning the ratification of 
the CTBT, the reduction of its nuclear forces by withdrawing all its air-delivered 
nuclear weapons, transparency about the size of its stocks of nuclear material and 
submission of excess nuclear material to EURATOM safeguards, and the start of 
the research on verification. 11) 
  France mentioned as efforts in nuclear disarmament its complete phasing out of 
land-based nuclear component and the reduction in the format of the airborne and 
sea-based components, the ratification of the CTBT, and the definitive closure of 
the Mururoa test site. Regarding multilateral process, France emphasized the 
importance of the entry into force of the CTBT and negotiations on a fissile 
material cut-off treaty. France attached the utmost importance to maintaining 
strategic stability, of which the ABM Treaty was an essential element, and was 
anxious to avoid any challenges to the Treaty liable to bring about a breakdown of 
strategic equilibrium and to restart the arms race. 12) 
  China criticized that the progress in nuclear disarmament by the U.S. and Russia 
was not enough, and the so-called missile defense program would inevitably exert 
an extensive negative impact on international security and stability and trigger off a 
new round of arms race in new areas, thereby seriously obstructing or neutralizing 
international efforts of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. China's 
nuclear weapons were said to be solely of the purpose of self-defense and deployed 
with utmost restraint. China has unconditionally undertaken not to be the first to 
use nuclear weapons and China is now in the process of its ratification of the 
CTBT. In connection with a cut-off treaty, China thinks that the prevention of the 
weaponization of outer space is a task even more urgent than the FMCT
10) Statement by H.E. Mr. Igor S. Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the 
   Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New 
  York, April 25,2000; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.14, 8 May 2000. 
11) Towards A Nuclear-Free World: the United Kingdom and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Peter 
  Hain MP, Minister of State, Foreign Office, NPT Review Conference, New York, 24th April 2000.
12) Debat general, Intervention de S. E. Hubert de La Fortelle, Representant de la France aupres de la 
  Conference du Desarmement, Conference d'Eamen du TNP, New York, mardi 25 avril 2000; NPT/ 
  CONF.2000/WP.8, 4 May 2000.
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negotiation. 
  On transparency, China said "Nuclear-weapon states have differed a lot in their 
nuclear strategies and different arsenals therefore it is unreasonable to ask these 
countries to take the same transparency measures at the same time .... it is neither 
conducive to their own security nor in the interest of global strategic balance and 
stability to ask the small or medium sized nuclear countries to take transparency 
measures." On the contrary, China asked nuclear-weapon states to unconditionally 
undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. 13) 
  In spite of the fact that opinions are quite different among the nuclear-weapon 
states, on the first day of the second week, they submitted a common statement 
consisting of 23 paragraphs. 14) They formally reiterate the strong and continuing 
support for this Treaty, reaffirm their commitment o strengthening the review 
process of the Treaty and to the principles and objectives for nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament, reiterate the need for universal adherence to the 
NPT, and stress the importance of compliance. 
  They reiterate their unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goals of a complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament. 
In pursuit of the program of action set out by the 1995 Review and Extension 
Conference, there have been highly significant developments. 
  On the CTBT, there should be no doubtas to the commitment of the five 
countries to secure its early entry into force. However, on the FMCT, they affirm 
the necessity of a treaty and urge the CD to agree on a program of work which 
includes the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on 
such a treaty, just the same as Chinese proposal. On a nuclear reduction, their 
contribution has been and will be highlighted by each of them nationally. They 
declare that none of their nuclear weapons are targeted at any state. 
  On the START process and the ABM Treaty, they look forward to the 
conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening 
the ABM Treaty, compromising the different positions of the N-5. They are 
committed to placing fissile materials no longer required for defense purposes 
under the IAEA or other relevant international verification. They express their 
support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and reaffirm their commitment o UN
13) Statement by H.E. Amb. Sha Zukang, Head of Delegation of the Government of the People's Republic 
   of China at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
  Weapons, 24 April 2000, New York; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.7, 5 May 2000; NPT/CONF.2000/ 
  MC.I/CRP.13, 8 May 2000. 
14) NPT/CONF.2000/21, 1 May 2000.
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Security Council resolution 984. 
2. Arguments by the NAC and the NAM 
  The New Agenda Coalition (NAC), consisting of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, 
Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, states that the period of this 
review has not delivered systematic and progressive fforts by the nuclear-weapon 
states, nor the entry into force of any multilateral instrument in the field of nuclear 
disarmament. They express their concern on re-statements of policies and postures 
which reaffirm the central role of nuclear weapons in strategic concepts and the 
possibility of fighting war with the use of nuclear weapons. 
  As for future actions, they demand that the five nuclear-weapon states make an 
unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their arsenals and, in 
the course of the forthcoming review period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated 
process of negotiations and to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament. In 
addition, they ask the five nuclear-weapon states to take following measures as 
early and interim steps: (a) to adopt nuclear policies to preclude the use of nuclear 
weapons; (b) to proceed to the de-alerting and the removal of nuclear warheads 
from delivery vehicles; (c) to reduce tactical nuclear weapons; (d) to demonstrate 
greater transparency; (e) to provide legally binding negative security assurance, and 
(f) to apply the principle of irreversibility. 15) 
  The Countries of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) emphasize that the 
implementation of commitments in Article VI has been of great concern to the 
members of the Movement. This is reflected by the lack of progress in fulfilling the 
provisions of Article VI. Citing the dangers posed by nuclear armaments to 
humanity and to the survival of civilization, the Movement calls for a reversal of 
the nuclear arms race and for the complete limination of these arsenals. 
  Although NAM's proposals overlap with these of the NAC, the characteristic of 
the NAM resides in their call upon the CD to establish an ad hoc committee on 
nuclear disarmament and to commence negotiations on a phased program of nuclear 
disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified 
framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon convention. They also ask to 
refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes, and call upon the nuclear-
weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the
15) Statement by Ambassador Rosario Green, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mexico on Behalf of the 
   Delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, General 
  Debate, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
  Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000; NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3, 24 April 2000.
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objectives of the CTBT.16) 
3. Arguments by Intermediary States 
  What was unique at the 2000 Review Conference was that between the five 
nuclear-weapon states and the NAC/NAM, intermediary states, including Japan and 
Australia, the European Union (EU), the NATO-5, and Canada, played their role to 
accommodate othe two main confronting players and try to find out compromises. 
  First, Japan with Australia submitted a working paper which includes following 
eight points: 17) 
  1. The early entry into force of the CTBT and moratorium on nuclear test 
explosion pending the entry into force of that Treaty. 
  2. The immediate commencement of negotiations on a FMCT and their 
conclusion preferably before 2003, but not later than 2005, and pending the entry 
into force of the treaty, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons. 
  3. The immediate ntry into force and the full implementation of START II, 
the early commencement and completion of the negotiations on START III, and 
continuation of the process beyond START III. 
  4. Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals 
unilaterally, and the commencement of negotiations involving the nuclear-weapon 
states for the reduction of nuclear weapons at an appropriate stage. 
  5. Multilateral discussion in the CD on possible future steps on nuclear 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. 
  6. The early completion of the negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 
Central Asia. 
  7. Universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol and early establishment of
the Integrated Safeguards. 
  8. The disposition of fissile materials no longer required for defense purposes 
and placement of such materials and civil fissile materials under appropriate 
international safeguards. 
  This is the first time for Japan to submit a working paper to the NPT review
16) Statement by H.E. Dr. Makarim Wibisono, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia at 
   the General Debate in the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
   of Nuclear Weapons to introduce a Working Paper submitted by the Members of the Movement of Non-
  Aligned Countries Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 24, April 2000; 
  NPT/CONF.2000/18, 24 April 2000; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.6, 5 May 2000. 
17) NPT/CONF.2000/WP. 1, 24 April 2000.
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conferences. It was also the epoch-making first occasion for Japan to submit the 
working paper under co-sponsorship with Australia, and Japan also tried to get 
Canada's co-sponsorship. 
  The European Union strongly supports the early entry into force of the CTBT 
and immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a FMCT. 
In addition, they emphasize the application of the principle of irreversibility to 
guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, the 
increased transparency as voluntary CBM measures to support further progress in 
disarmament, and the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.18) 
  The NATO-5 Countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway and the 
Netherlands) take a position one step further for nuclear disarmament than the EU. 
They propose the entry into force of the CTBT no later than the 2005 Review 
Conference, the conclusion of a FMCT no later than the 2005 Conference, and the 
reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and their ultimate elimination. On 
transparency, they ask the nuclear-weapon states to provide periodically the 
aggregated numbers of warheads, delivery systems and stocks of fissile materials 
for explosive purposes, and a written account of the progress achieved in nuclear 
disarmament. 19) 
  Canada proposes the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT and a 
universal moratorium on nuclear testing, the early conclusion of negotiations on a 
FMCT including appropriate measures to deal with stocks of fissile materials, the 
achievement of START III and the pursuance of further substantial reduction, the 
reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and the pursuance of 
measures like de-alerting and de-mating.20) 
IV. Review of Measures on Nuclear Disarmament 
  Discussions on the review on the progress in nuclear disarmament during the 
last five years were taken place in the Main Committee I. Based on the general 
debates and working papers submitted by states or state groups, the chairman 
submitted his working paper on May 421), and then based on the working paper,
18) Council Common Position of 13 April 2000 relating to the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the 
   Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
   19. 4. 2000; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.S, 2 May 2000; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/CRP.1, 3 May 
  2000. 
19) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7, 4 May 2000; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.l/SB.l/CRP.1, 3 May 2000. 
20) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.4, 2 May 2000. 
21) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5, 4 May 2000.
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discussions were continued. The chairman submitted revised working papers on 
May 922) and 1123). The last working paper was included in the report of the Main 
Committee 124) and submitted to the plenary meeting. The discussions continued 
based on it, and finally the final document was agreed. The review of measures on 
nuclear disarmament is included in paragraphs 1 to 14 of "Article VI and 
preambular paragraphs 8 to 12" of the final document. 
  In the final document, the Conference first notes the reaffirmation by the states 
parties of their commitment to Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12 of the 
Treaty. As general evaluation, "The Conference notes that, despite the achievement 
in bilateral and unilateral arms reduction, the total number of nuclear weapons 
deployed and in stockpile still amounts to many thousands. The Conference 
expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the 
possibility that these nuclear weapons could be used." 
  On the one hand, the United States and other nuclear-weapon states argued that 
during the last five years they identified much progress in nuclear reduction and 
disarmament. On the other hand, the NAC and the NAM criticized the lack of 
progress in nuclear disarmament. The NAC shared the Secretary-General of the 
UN's concern that "over the last few years we have witnessed the reaffirmation of 
nuclear weapon doctrines of all the nuclear-weapon states. Some states retain first-
use nuclear doctrines and some do not exclude the use of such weapons even 
against non-nuclear-weapon states". 25) The concern on nuclear weapon doctrines 
was included in the chairman's working papers, but it was deleted at the final stage 
in the discussions on the final document. 
  The Conference takes note of the proposal made by the Secretary-General of the 
UN on the convening an international conference to eliminate nuclear danger. 26) 
The Conference reaffirms that the cessation of all nuclear test explosions will 
contribute to the non-proliferation and to the process of nuclear disarmament. The 
Conference welcomes the adoption and opening for signature of the CTBT, and 
calls upon all states to continue their efforts to ensure the early entry into force of 
the Treaty.. The Conference welcomes the final declaration adopted at the 
conference on facilitating the entry into force of the CTBT, convened in October
22) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.1, 9 May 2000. 
23) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.2, 11 May 2000. 
24) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.1I1, 11 May 2000. 
25) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.8, 5 May 2000. 
26) United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fourth session, Agenda item 49(b) The Millennium Assembly 
   of the United Nations, We the Peoples: the Roles of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, 
   Report of the Secretary-General, A/54/2000, 27 March 2000, p.56.
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1999. However, the Conference could not agree on the proposal mainly submitted 
by South Africa that "The Conference recalls the undertakings given in statement at 
the time of the negotiation of the CTBT, and calls upon all states not to conduct 
tests for the further development and modernization of nuclear weapons."27) 
  The reference to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
of 1996 was strongly argued for by non-nuclear-weapons states, and in particular by 
Malaysia and Costa Rica28), but the U.S. asked to delete the reference.29) In the 
final document, the Conference notes the International Court of Justice advisory 
opinion on the "Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" issued at The 
Hague on 8 July 1996. However, the phrases referring to the obligation to bring to 
a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament and the fact that the 
phrase was adopted unanimously were deleted. On a FMCT, the Conference 
regrets that negotiations have not been pursued on this issue. 
  On nuclear disarmament, the Conference welcomes the significant progress 
achieved in nuclear weapons reductions made unilaterally or bilaterally under the 
START process, and recognized that completion of ratification of START II by the 
United States remains a priority. The Conference also welcomes the significant 
unilateral reduction measures taken by other nuclear-weapon states, and the efforts 
to cooperate in making nuclear disarmament measures irreversible. 
  The Conference reiterates the important contribution made by Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine through their voluntary withdrawal of nuclear weapons, 
and welcomes the signing by Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine 
and the United States of significant agreements relating to the ABM Treaty. At 
last, the Conference notes the nuclear-weapon states declaration that none of their 
nuclear weapons are targeted at any state. 
  Some of the previous NPT review conferences could not adopt a final document, 
mainly because of the strong confrontation between the nuclear-weapon states and 
the non-nuclear-weapon states on whether significant progress in nuclear 
disarmament in the previous five years was seen or not. At this Review 
Conference, each nuclear-weapon state expressed how much they made efforts for 
nuclear disarmament and how much result they got. However, in the last five years, 
international circumstances surrounding security deteriorated and accordingly there 
was not significant progress in nuclear disarmament. Prior to the conference, it was 
concerned that how much the nuclear-weapon states would accept he arguments by
27) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.1/CRP.8, 5 May 2000; NPT/CONF.2000/MC.UCRP.16, 10 May 2000. 
28) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/WP.4, 8 May 2000. 
29) NPT/CONF.2000/MC. I/CRP. 10, 5 May 2000.
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the non-nuclear-weapon states, and some experts were pessimistic for the 
Conference to adopt a final document. They argued that even when there was no 
consensus on the review of the previous five years, the conference should endeavor 
to agree on a document that includes future measures of nuclear disarmament. 
  At this Review Conference, the discussions were proceeded based on the 
chairman's working paper, and it was generally afraid at the beginning of the last 
week that this Conference might fail to adopt a final document. However, the 
serious discussion on the review started just when it became clear that the 
Subsidiary Body I discussing future measures of nuclear disarmament was close to 
an agreement in the last week. Although there were some important points on the 
past review where there was no agreement, he NAC countries showed significant 
compromise on the past review because "an unequivocal undertaking of nuclear 
elimination" was agreed as one of the future measures of nuclear disarmament. As 
a result, agreement was achieved mainly because almost all paragraphs that the 
NAC had confronted with opposition by the nuclear-weapon states were deleted. 
V. Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament 
  Measures for future nuclear disarmament were discussed at the Subsidiary Body 
I. Based on the general debates and working papers submitted by states or state 
groups, the first chairman's working paper which was divided into two parts was 
submitted on May 430) and 8.31) The discussions were continued based on the 
chairman's working paper, which was revised on May 9,32) 15,33) 16,34) and 1735), 
then it was adopted in the final document. In the final document, these measures 
were listed in paragraph 15 of "Article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12". 
  The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and 
progressive fforts to implement Article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4(c) 
of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament". 
  I will examine all sub-paragraphs one by one by discussing arguments and 
counter-arguments during the discussions, because this part includes many issues
30) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/CRP.2, 4 May 2000. 
31) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/CRP 4, 8 May 2000. 
32) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.1/SB.I/CRP.7, 9 May 2000. 
33) NPT/CONF.2000/CRP.2, 15 May 2000. 
34) Chairman's Working Paper, 16 May 2000. 
35) Non-Paper, 17 May 2000.
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which attracted much attention, for example, the issues of NMD/ABM Treaty and 
unequivocal undertaking of nuclear elimination. 
1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay 
and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to 
achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty. 
  The content of this paragraph was included in the working papers submitted by 
Japan and Australia, the NAC, the NAM, the EU, the NATO-5, Canada, and 
China. 36) The statement by the five nuclear-weapon states (N-5) also included the 
content. As a result, there existed general consensus on this issue. The NAM 
proposal asked the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from conducting all types of 
tests, which meant the prohibition of subcritical tests. The NATO-5 proposed to 
ensure the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT, but not later than the 2005 
Review Conference. Neither proposal was agreed upon. The United States once 
made a reservation on "without conditions" and asked the insertion of "in 
accordance with constitutional processes", because the Senate rejected the 
ratification of the Treaty. Some argued that the latter phrase is unnecessary because 
it was implied in the treaty-making process, but finally it was included. 
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear 
explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty. 
  The moratorium pending its entry into force was included in the proposals by 
Japan and Australia, the NAC, the NAM, Canada, and Switzerland,37) but not 
included in the proposals by the EU, the NATO-5, China, and the N-5. This 
paragraph was adopted without any significant argument. However the moratorium 
of testing is very important because there exists strong opposition to the Treaty in 
the United States, and China might consider the resumption of nuclear tests as the 
U.S. NMD program proceeds. 
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-
discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty 
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator 
in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both
36) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.1, I May 2000. 
37) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.3, 2 May 2000.
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nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation bjectives. The Conference 
on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme ofwork which includes the 
immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their 
conclusion within five years. 
  On this issue there were many arguments, with the strong opposition by China. 
Finally the expression f the paragraph was based on the one in the N-5 statement. 
The demand on a moratorium on the production of fissile materials pending the 
conclusion of a treaty was not included in the final document due to strong 
opposition by China. "The immediate commencement a d early conclusion of the 
negotiations ona treaty" was included in the proposals by Japan and Australia, the 
EU, the NAM, and the NATO-5, and the NAC proposed the importance and 
urgency of achieving a treaty. 
  On the timetable, Japan and Australia proposed "preferably before 2003, but not 
later than 2005", the NATO-5 proposed "not later than 2005 Review Conference", 
and the chairman's early working paper said "with a view to their conclusion by 
2005". However, the final document includes the phrase " with a view to their 
conclusion within five years", which permits the interpretation that it means within 
five years after the negotiation begins. It will be beyond 2005. 
  On the content of a FMCT, the final document adopted the phrase "taking into 
consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation", which 
originally proposed by the NAC. This confirms the possibility that the issue of 
stockpile will be discussed, but the reference is not so direct as the NAM proposal 
which says "a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material" and 
the Canadian proposal that "appropriate measures to deal with stocks of fissile 
material... should be identified and implemented". 
  China argued that preventing arms race in outer space (PAROS) was more 
urgent han a cut-off treaty, and accordingly the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva should establish three ad hoc committees tonegotiate a FMCT, PAROS 
and nuclear disarmament. 
  On the moratorium, almost all states, including Japan and Australia, the NAC, 
the EU, Switzerland, the NATO-5, and Canada, supported toinclude it in the final 
document, but China's strong opposition resulted in no mention of it. In the 
negotiation process, the first chairman's working paper included the moratorium 
and then deleted. Many states asked for revival of the moratorium but it was not 
accepted. 
  China's strong opposition to the moratorium implies that China is still 
continuing production of fissile material for weapons purpose or at least China
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wants to leave the option open. It suggests that China is continuing its 
modernization of nuclear forces, and China anticipates the necessity to counter the 
NMD program of the U.S. 
  The Conference urges the CD to agree on a program of work, which includes the 
immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on such a treaty. 
The Conference does not urge the immediate commencement and early conclusion 
of negotiations of such a treaty. It means that the linkage that China demanded 
above is possible, and accordingly we can not expect the immediate 
commencement of the negotiations. It means that this paragraph goes backward 
compared with the 1995 decision. 
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an 
appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. 
The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work 
which includes the immediate establishment of such a body. 
  The first chairman's working paper included the first sentence, but later the 
second sentence was added in order to take the same formula as the sub-paragraph 
3 above. The first sentence is just the same as the NAC proposal. Japanese and 
Australian proposal asked "multilateral discussion in the Conference on 
Disarmament on possible future steps on nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation", the NATO-5 asked "ad hoc working group for the exchange of 
information and views on endeavors towards nuclear disarmament", and Canada 
asked "a mechanism for exchange of information and the substantive discussion of 
nuclear disarmament issues". 
  On the other hand, the NAM called upon the CD to establish an ad hoc 
committee on nuclear disarmament and commence negotiations on a phased 
programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons with a specific framework of time, including a nuclear-weapon treaty. 
Malaysia and Costa Rica proposed to commence negotiations leading to the 
conclusion of a nuclear weapon convention, as a follow-up to the ICJ advisory 
opinion. 38) The N-5 statement did not mention on this issue and China asked to 
establish three ad hoc committees simultaneously as mentioned above. 
  According to this sub-paragraph, the CD is urged to start discussions, not 
negotiations, on nuclear disarmament. It is asked not only to discuss the issue but 
also to establish an appropriate subsidiary body. It means that something between
38) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/WP.4, 8 May 2000.
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just discussions and negotiations was agreed. Just the same as the previous sub-
paragraph, this measure is not urged directly, but agreement on a programme of 
work including this measure is urged. Then the problem of linkage emerges. 
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and 
other arms control and reduction measures. 
  The principle of irreversibility has been often emphasized in nuclear 
disarmament egotiations. The NAC and the EU proposed this measure. Russia 
argued that the principle was too abstract and more concrete principle was 
necessary. However, on this principle there was general consensus. One of the 
controversial issues was whether this principle should be applied only to nuclear 
weapons or but also to other weapons. As the nuclear-weapon states argued, other 
weapons also were included. The other controversial issue was whether this 
principle should be applied to or should guide disarmament measures. The NAC 
demanded "apply" and the EU demanded "guide", and "apply" was adopted in the 
final document. 
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the 
total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to 
which all states parties are committed under Article VI. 
  The undertaking to nuclear disarmament has been expressed as "nuclear 
disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons", which 
was initially submitted by Japan in 1994 and has been later accepted even by the 
nuclear-weapon states. Initially the phrase was highly evaluated because it referred 
to the elimination of nuclear weapons even though it was an ultimate goal. In last 
several years, there was no progress toward elimination of nuclear weapons, and the 
phrase was criticized because it helped to defer the elimination far away into the 
ultimate future. It has no practical effect in promoting nuclear disarmament. 
  This sub-paragraph was originally submitted by the NAC. This was the most 
important one for the NAC and this was listed at the top of the NAC proposal. On 
this issue, the confrontation between the NAC and the N-5 was sharpest. NAC's 
original proposal asked "The five nuclear-weapon states make an unequivocal 
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the 
course of the forthcoming review period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated 
process of negotiations and to take steps, leading to nuclear disarmament to which 
all states parties are committed under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".
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  The N-5 states were initially strongly opposed to it and declared it unacceptable. 
Instead, in the N-5 statement, hey "reiterate their unequivocal commitment to the 
ultimate goals of a complete limination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Here 
both a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament were characterized as the ultimate goals. 
  Two kinds of criticism of this statement came from the NAC and the NAM 
countries. One was against "ultimate goal", which they thought lost its historical 
mission because it did not help make progress in nuclear disarmament and instead 
justified negligence by the nuclear-weapon states of their commitment to nuclear 
elimination as it was ultimate goal. In place of "ultimate goal", they asked 
"unequivocal undertaking". The other was against including "a general and 
complete disarmament" in addition to nuclear elimination. The NAC states argued 
that only nuclear elimination should be referred, because the final document of the 
first United Nations special session on disarmament of 1978 clearly gave priority of 
negotiation to nuclear disarmament, and the ICJ in its advisory opinion clearly 
mentioned an obligation to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear 
disarmament as its interpretation of Article VI. 
  In the last week of the Conference, the NAC yielded to delete "and, in the 
course of the forthcoming review period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated 
process of negotiations and to take steps." Even with this compromise by the NAC, 
Russia and France did not agree this sub-paragraph until just one day before the last 
day of the Conference. 
  This sub-paragraph is one of the most important fruits at this Conference. As 
the part was deleted from the original proposal, the undertaking to take concrete 
measures in coming five years was not included, although the undertaking to 
accomplish the total elimination was secured. In other paragraphs, many concrete 
measures for nuclear disarmament are stipulated, and we must carefully watch how 
and whether the undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals is implemented. 
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the 
conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and 
strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a 
basis for further reduction of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its 
provisions. 
  This sub-paragraph deals with both START process and the ABM Treaty. 
Although the two issues are deeply interrelated, I will examine them separately. On
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START II, Japan and Australia proposed "the immediate ntry into force and the 
full implementation", the NAC proposed "full implementation", the NAM proposed 
"full and early implementation and the EU proposed "the prompt entr
y into force 
and timely implementation". The first chairman's working paper provided for "the 
prompt entry into force and full implementation" and then was changed into "the 
early entry into force and full implementation". 
  On START III, Japan and Australia proposed "the early commencement and 
conclusion of the negotiations on START III, and continuation of the process 
beyond START III", the NAC proposed "to commence without further delay 
negotiations on START III with a view of its early conclusion", the NAM proposed 
"the early commencement of negotiations of START III"
, and the EU proposed 
"the early commencement of negotiations on START III" . The N-5 statement 
proposed "the conclusion of START III as soon as possible" and this phrase was 
adopted in the final document. The Japanese and Australian proposal was most 
ambitious asking further reduction by continuing the process beyond START III, 
but was rejected by Russia and was not included in the final document. 
  One of the most controversial issues at this conferencewas the U.S. program on 
the NMD. In this connection, the ABM Treaty was widely discussed. In the 
general debates in the first several days, many countries expressed their concern on 
the NMD, mainly because this would undermine strategic stability, cause new 
nuclear arms race, and jeopardize the system of nuclear arms control and 
disarmament which has been established last thirty years. In particular, Russia and 
China, that would be directly influenced, were opposed most severely, and France 
also criticized it from the viewpoint of strategic stability. The EU reaffirmed the 
importance of the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability, the NAC 
stressed that the ABM Treaty remained a cornerstone of strategic stability and 
underlined the responsibility of its states parties to preserve its integration, and the 
NAM was concerned over the negative implications of the development and 
deployment of ABM system and called upon the parties to fully comply with its 
provisions. 
  On the other hand, the U.S. in the remarks by Secretary of State, Ms. Albright, 
stated, "The world has changed dramatically in the almost three decades ince the 
ABM Treaty was signed. The Treaty has been amended before, and there is no 
good reason it cannot be amended again to reflect new threats from third countries 
outside the strategic deterrence regime. And please remember that we are talking 
about a system capable of defending against at most a few tens of incoming 
missiles. It is not intended to degrade Russia's deterrent. Nor will it have that
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result." 
  This confrontation between the U.S. on the one hand and other nuclear-weapons 
states and many non-nuclear-weapon states on the other hand, was in a sense settled 
when the N-5 submitted their common statement at the first day of the second 
week. In the statement, they look forward to the conclusion of START III as soon 
as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of 
strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive 
weapons, in accordance with its provisions. There was an agreement among the 
five nuclear-weapon states on this sentence. The N-5 common statement as a 
whole is a result of compromise among the five, but this part reflects the U.S. 
concern. Russia, China and France, which are opposed to the amendment of the 
ABM treaty, seem to emphasize the word "preserving", while the U.S. seems to 
emphasize the word "strengthening" which allows its amendment. The sentence 
that was included in the N-5 statement was agreed in the final document. 
  In spite of the strong opposition by Russia, China and France, the U.S. 
succeeded to defend its NMD program. In order to defend its position on this issue, 
the U.S. was obliged to yield in other issues. On the whole, the U.S. was rather 
defensive at the Conference, because the U.S. gave the promotion of the NMD 
program the top priority. 
  The most eminent example was the compromise on a FMCT. In spite of its 
traditional position that an immediate commencement and early conclusion of a 
FMCT should be the first priority in multilateral negotiations, the U.S. accepted 
Chinese position which allowed the linkage of a FMCT to other issues. It means 
that the U.S. sacrificed the progress in nuclear disarmament in order to save the 
NMD program. 
  During discussions after the N-5 statement was agreed, Russia strongly urged 
the insert of the phrase like "for the maintenance of strategic stability" on concrete 
measures for nuclear disarmament, and China also emphasized the importance of 
strategic stability. This iridescent settlement is based on the understanding that the 
NMD issue cannot be solved at this Conference, and it is clever to avoid the 
confrontation in order to save the Conference itself. In fact, the issue was shelved 
for a while. The issue continues to be controversial in negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament. 
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the 
United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency.
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  The U.S. and Russia have already dismantled some of their nuclear weapons, 
and agreed to submit heir nuclear materials from dismantled nuclear weapons 
under the IAEA safeguards and implemented the agreement in part in order to 
prevent he process from going reversibly. This sub-paragraph asks the two 
countries to broaden the scope and implement completely. This was adopted 
without much discussion. 
  The NAC proposed "to further develop the Trilateral Initiative between the U.S., 
Russia and the IAEA so as to include all five nuclear-weapon states in similar 
arrangements and to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile materials from 
weapons programme". This proposal has been reflected in the sub-paragraph 10
below. The first chairman's working paper provided for "the further development 
of the Trilateral Initiative" and its meaning was not clear, and then it was changed 
into "the completion and implementation". 
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament in a 
way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of 
undiminished security for all: 
  This sub-paragraphcontains ix concrete measures, but initially each of these 
six measures had independent sub-paragraphs ju t the same as other sub-
paragraphs. At the final stage, these six measures were gotten together to form one 
sub-paragraph with a common chapeau as all measures are addressed tonuclear-
weapon states. The reason why they were combined is that hese six measures are 
commonly addressed to nuclear-weapon states for nuclear disarmament, and that 
some of the measures were conditioned by the phrase like "for maintenance of 
strategic stability" mainly by Russia, and it was thought better to have a common 
chapeau by taking the concern into account but not directly referring to "strategic 
stability". 
  In this sub-paragraph, six measures are contained including unilateral reduction, 
increased transparency, reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, reduction of 
operational status, diminishing role for nuclear weapons, and engagement of all 
nuclear-weapon states. In the process of negotiations, Russia and China asked to 
add the phase "strategic stability" to all measures except transparency and 
engagement. This was a clear expression that hey were opposed to the U.S. NMD 
program and the ABM Treaty should be strictly observed. Finally, the phrase "in a 
way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of 
undiminished security for all" was adopted, in place of "maintaining strategic 
stability". The phrase was changed but the content did not change much.
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  The NAC proposed following six measures, as early and interim steps: (a) to 
adapt their nuclear policies and postures so as to preclude the use of nuclear 
weapons; (b) to proceed to the de-alerting, and to the removal of nuclear warheads 
from delivery vehicles; (c) to reduce tactical nuclear weapons; (d) to demonstrate 
greater transparency; (e) to further develop the Trilateral Initiative so as to include 
five nuclear-weapon states; and (f) to apply the principle of irreversibility. 
Measures in (e) and (f) are treated as independent sub-paragraphs in the final 
document.
- Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals 
unilaterally. 
  After the end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia, and later the 
United Kingdom and France have reduced their nuclear arsenals unilaterally. This 
paragraph asks further efforts for unilateral reduction. Only Japan and Australia 
proposed unilateral reduction. Some of the nuclear-weapon states were reluctant to 
accept this proposal, but it was agreed in the final document. In the process of 
negotiation, once the chairman's working paper included the phrase "for the 
maintenance of strategic stability", but deleted soon. 
- Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to the 
nuclear weapon capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to 
Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further 
progress on nuclear disarmament. 
  The NAC proposed "greater transparency with regard to their nuclear arsenals 
and fissile material inventories", and the EU proposed "increased transparency as a 
voluntary CBM to support further progress in disarmament", and accordingly the 
first chairman's working paper combined these two proposals. The NATO-5 
proposed to provide periodically the aggregated numbers of warheads, delivery 
systems and stocks of fissile materials. 
  China was strongly opposed to the increased transparency from the beginning, 
and stated "Nuclear-weapon states have differed a lot in their nuclear strategies and 
different arsenals therefore it is unreasonable to ask these countries to take the same 
transparency measures at the same time....it is neither conductive to their own 
security nor in the interest of global strategic balance and stability to ask the small 
or medium sized nuclear countries to take transparency measures." Other nuclear-
weapon states did not agree to provide concrete numbers of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear stockpiles. As a result, "their nuclear arsenals and fissile material
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inventories" was watered down into the very abstract phrase "nuclear weapons 
capability". 
  Another point of discussion was whether to deal with transparency measures as 
"voluntary" CBM measures. The first two chairman's working papers did not 
include the word "voluntary", but the nuclear-weapon states and the EU, and in 
particular France, strongly argued for including "voluntary" and it was so decided 
in the final document. 
  In spite of the fact that the content of transparency measures was severely 
watered down, China did not agree this paragraph until the very last day of the 
Conference. 
- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons , based on unilateral 
initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and 
disarmament process. 
  The NAC proposed "to reduce tactical nuclear weapons and to proceed to their 
elimination as an integral part of nuclear arms reduction", the EU proposed 
"underlining the importance of non-strategic nuclear weapon in the framework of 
nuclear arms reduction efforts", and the NATO-5 encouraged the U.S. and Russia 
to proceed with the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and to include their 
reduction and ultimate elimination in the overall nuclear arms reduction 
negotiations. 39) 
  The first chairman's working paper provided that "The further reduction of non-
strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent and irreversible manner and a process 
leading to their total elimination as an integral part of nuclear arms reductions." 
However, Russia stated that it was unilaterally reducing them, and this measure 
should not be taken up independently. Russia proposed to add the phrases 
"building on unilateral initiatives" and "as an integral part of nuclear disarmament"
, 
as well as "in the context of strategic stability". 
  As a result, the final document includes the phrases "based on unilateral 
initiative" and "as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament 
process". 
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of 
nuclear weapons systems. 
  The NAC proposed "to proceed to the de-alerting, to the removal of nuclear
39) Finland also submitted its own proposal on non-strategic nuclear weapons. NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/ 
   SB.I/WP.3, 3 May 2000.
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warheads from delivery vehicles and to the withdrawal of all nuclear forces from 
active deployment pending their complete elimination", and Canada proposed "As 
regards nuclear-weapon doctrines and operations, appropriate measures (e.g., de-
alerting, de-mating, transparency, confidence-building) should be pursued." 
  The common statement by the N-5 included the declaration on de-targeting, 
stating "We declare that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at any state." 
When French representative introduced this common statement on behalf of the five 
nuclear-weapon states, he read only this paragraph, suggesting that this declaration 
was particularly important among many paragraphs included in the statement. 
  The first two chairman's papers were similar with the NAC proposal. China 
said it could not accept it, and instead, China proposed to include the withdrawal of 
nuclear weapons deployed in other countries, the opposition to nuclear umbrella or 
nuclear sharing. Other nuclear-weapon states also asked to delete all concrete 
measures excluding de-targeting. There were strong conflicting arguments among 
the N-5 and the NAC. The issue of strategic stability was also discussed in 
connection with this measure. As a result, with strong arguments by the N-5, all 
concrete measures like de-alerting was deleted and very abstract phrase "reduce the 
operational status of nuclear weapons ystem" was adopted in the final document. 
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the 
risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total 
elimination. 
  The NAC underlined the imperative of lessening the role of nuclear weapons in 
security policy and proposed to adapt their nuclear policies and postures so as to 
preclude the use of nuclear weapons. Myanmar also proposed as interim measures 
to review and adapt nuclear policies to reduce the nuclear danger and to de-
emphasize the role of nuclear weapons. 40) 
  The general response by the nuclear-weapon states was negative to these 
proposals, stating that NATO was under reexamination of its nuclear policy or that 
this issue should not be treated in isolation. The issue of strategic stability was also 
discussed in this connection. The focal point of discussions was whether to 
"minimize" or "exclude" the risk that these weapons ever be used, and as the N-5 
and its aligned countries argued for, the word "minimize" was adopted in the final 
document.
40) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.UCRP.4, 3 May 2000.
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- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in 
the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. 
   Japan and Australia proposed "the commencement of negotiations involving the 
nuclear-weapon states for the reduction of nuclear weapons at an appropriate stage" 
in connection with unilateral reduction, and the NAC proposed "The nuclear-
weapon states undertake to proceed to the early integration of all five nuclear-
weapon states into the process leading to the total elimination of their respective 
nuclear weapons". Canada also proposed that the other three nuclear-weapon states 
should become directly engaged in the START process in the near future. 
   The N-5 statement said "The contribution of the five nuclear-weapon states to 
systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally has been and 
will be highlighted by each of us nationally". France and the United Kingdom 
resisted to "the engagement at an early stage" because they thought they had 
enough reduced unilaterally. As a result the phrase "as soon as appropriate" was 
adopted in the final document. 
10. Arrangement by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, 
fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military 
purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and 
arrangement for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to 
ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programme. 
  Japan and Australia proposed "The disposition of fissile materials no longer 
required for defense purposes and placement of such materials and civil fissile 
materials under appropriate international safeguards with a view to ensuring the 
irreversibility of nuclear disarmament", 41) and the NAC proposed to further develop 
the Trilateral Initiative so as to include all five nuclear-weapon states in similar 
arrangement. The EU proposed to place fissile material designated as no longer 
required for defense purposes under appropriate international safeguards and 
physical protection, and the NATO-5 proposed almost the same. 
  The N-5 in its common statement said "We are committed to placing as soon as 
practicable fissile materials designated by each of us as no longer required for 
defense purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification. We have 
launched a number of significant initiatives to provide for the safe and effective 
management and disposition of such materials". 
  All the proposals were in principle the same with no substantive confrontation,
41) Later, Japan and Australia submitted a working paper which deleted "civil fissile materials". (NPT/ 
   CONF.2000.MC.1/SB.I/WP.1, 3 May 2000.)
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and the discussions focused on the option of words or phrases. 
11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of states in the 
disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control. 
  This sub-paragraph appeared in later stage of the negotiations in connection 
with the unequivocal undertaking of nuclear elimination. As I have described in the 
context of sub-paragraph 6, the nuclear-weapon states, in particular France, 
demanded to refer to general and complete disarmament in parallel with an 
unequivocal undertaking of nuclear elimination. On the contrary, the NAC argued 
that nuclear disarmament should have a priority and only nuclear disarmament 
should be included. As a compromise, it was agreed to refer only to nuclear 
disarmament in sub-paragraph 6 and have a new sub-paragraph on general and 
complete disarmament. 
12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review 
process, by all states parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 
4(c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996. 
  The NATO-5 proposed that "Nuclear-weapon states undertake to provide 
periodically within the framework of the strengthened review process, a written 
account of the progress achieved towards the implementation of Article VI of the 
Treaty and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Principles and Objectives", and the NAM 
proposed to inform the Secretary-General of the UN of the efforts and measures 
taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court 
of Justice. 
  The first chairman's working paper provided that "Reports by the nuclear-
weapon states on the implementation of Article VI within the framework of the 
NPT review process". In the process of negotiations, subject of the report was 
broadened from the nuclear-weapon states into all states parties, paragraph 4(c) was 
included in addition to Article VI as objects of the report, and reports was changed 
to annual reports and finally to regular eports. 
  The reference to the advisory opinion of the ICJ was included at the later stage 
of the negotiations, as non-nuclear-weapon states, and in particular Malaysia 
expressed the strong demand.
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13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required 
to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for 
the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
  This issue was initiated by the United Kingdom which submitted a working 
paper on the issue. 42) However, China was strongly opposed, saying that China 
could not accept it because it would prejudge the outcome of nuclear disarmament 
negotiations. 
  The precise expression which was included in earlier chairman's working paper 
as the further development, "nationally, bilaterally, multilaterally, and through 
relevant international organizations", of verification capabilities, was deleted. 
VI. Negative Security Assurances and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 
1. Negative Security Assurances 
  The issue of negative security assurances was discussed in the Main Committee 
I, which mainly discussed the review of nuclear disarmament. A chairman's 
working paper was at first submitted on May 4,43) and based on the discussions it 
was revised on May 944) and 11,45) when it was submitted to the plenary meeting as 
the report of the Main Committee 1.46) After this submission, discussions still 
continued. 
  The focal point of this issue concerns with legally binding negative security 
assurances. The NAC, the NAM and in particular Egypt47) naturally demanded 
legally binding assurances, and the NATO-5 mentioned that "legally binding 
security assurances bythe five nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon 
states parties to the NPT strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime". 
Common attitude of the nuclear-weapon states except China was that legally 
binding negative security assurances were expanded by the establishment of 
nuclear-weapon-free zones. 
  In the final document, the Conference at first reaffirms the principles of no-use 
of force of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, and then reaffirms that the 
total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use
42) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.UWP.6, 3 May 2000. 
43) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.UCRP.5, 4 May 2000. 
44) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.UCRP.5/Rev. 1, 9 May 2000. 
45) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/CRP.5/Rev.2, 11 May 2000. 
46) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.U1, 11 May 2000. 
47) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.UWP.1, 2 May 2000.
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or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the Conference agrees that legally 
binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-
weapon states parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
and calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 
Review Conference on this issue. It is the compromise between the nuclear-
weapon states which did not agree legally binding negative security assurances and 
the NAC and the NAM which strongly demanded them. 
  The Conference notes the reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon states of their 
commitment to the UN Security Council resolution 984 (1995), and also notes the 
establishment in March 1998 by the CD of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative 
security assurances. In this connection, some states argued for the re-establishment 
of the ad hoc committee, but it was not agreed. 
  China argued for the inclusion in the final document of the pledges of no-first-
use and negative security assurances, and conclusion of international convention for 
them, but it was finally deleted in the final document. 
  The Conference recognizes the important role which the establishment of new 
nuclear-weapon-free zones and the signature to the protocols of new and previously 
existing zones has played in extending negative security assurances, and underlines 
the importance of concerned states taking steps to bring into effect the assurances 
provided by nuclear-weapon-free zones and their protocols.
2. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones 
  Discussions on nuclear-weapon-free zones were conducted in the Main 
Committee II. Chairman's draft report of the Main Committee II was at first 
submitted on May 5, but the part of nuclear-weapon-free zones was blank. On May 
16, the report of the Main Committee II was submitted to the plenary meeting. 48) In 
the report, among ten paragraphs on nuclear-weapon-free zones, two were bold 
meaning there was no agreement on these paragraphs yet. Negotiations during last 
few days allowed the achievement of the consensus. 
  There existed general support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free 
zones. Japanese and Australian proposal touched upon only a Central Asian 
nuclear-weapon-free zone, but the NAC referred to the Middle East and South Asia 
and the NAM referred to Mongolia and the Southern Hemisphere. The N-5 
countries generally supported the establishment of zones, emphasized the 
importance of their signature and ratification of the relevant protocols, encouraged
48) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.1I/I, 16 May 2000.
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the states in Central Asia to pursue successfully their efforts, and expressed their 
support and respect of the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. 
  In the final document, at first, the Conference welcomes and supports the steps 
taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties since 1995, and 
reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones 
enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear 
disarmament. Then the Conference supports proposals for the establishment of 
nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not yet exist, such as in the Middle East 
and South Asia. The Conference welcomes and supports the declaration by 
Mongolia of its nuclear-weapon-free status, welcomes the Joint Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and urges its rapid implementation. 
  The Conference recognizes the continuing contributions that the Antarctic 
Treaty and the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba re making 
towards the achievement of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, 
and stresses the importance of signature and ratification of these treaties and the 
relevant protocols. 
  On the Middle East, the Conference welcomes the consensus reached in the 
General Assembly, and urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously 
taking the practical and urgent steps. In this context, some states argued that the 
Conference should urge Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place its nuclear 
facilities under full-scope safeguards, but there was no consensus on this point. 
  The conference welcomes the report on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-
free zones adopted by consensus by the Disarmament Commission on 30 April 
1999.491 The Conference supports the intention and commitment of the five Central 
Asian states to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, welcomes the practical steps 
they have taken, and believes that the international community should continue to 
promote the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. However, the 
initiative on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free space in Central and 
Eastern Europe proposed by Belarus was confronted with strong opposition mainly 
from other Central and Eastern European states, and it was not included in the final 
document.
49) General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-third session, Supplement No.42 (A/53/42), Report of the 
   Disarmament Commission, 1998, pp. 12-16.
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VII. Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
  The basic and common understanding among the states parties at the Conference 
was that the nuclear non-proliferation regime played a very important role in 
current international society and the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the center of the 
regime was extremely important for international peace and security, although 
various kinds of arguments were developed for four weeks. They agreed that 
although the Treaty was discriminatory in nature, it was better to remedy its 
shortcomings than to abandon the Treaty because of its discriminatory nature. 
   Prior to the Conference, an expert was concerned that some states might 
withdraw from the Treaty as the symbolic expression of dissatisfaction at the 
implementation of the Treaty. 50) However, at the Conference these kinds of 
arguments did not emerge. 
1. Universality 
  The number of the parties to the Treaty became 187 by adding 9 states ince the 
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. This number is the highest among 
many disarmament-related treaties. Non-parties are India, Israel, Pakistan and 
Cuba, but Cuba signed the additional Protocol with the IAEA and has no risk of 
proliferation. The conference, in the final document, refers to these four nations, 
and calls on those states to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states. 
  The first issue is India and Pakistan which conducted nuclear testsin May 1998 
and have been continuing its development of nuclear forces including missile 
development. Just after the tests, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1172 
(1998) and urged them to refrain from development of their nuclear forces and 
called upon them to accede the NPT. 
  The Conference recalls the Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and calls 
upon both states to take all the measures et out therein, and make it certain that 
notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and Pakistan do not have the status of 
nuclear-weapon states. The Conference urges them to accede to the NPT and to 
sign the CTBT. 
  The nuclear testing and development of nuclear forces by India and Pakistan is a 
great challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Although
50) William Potter, "The NPT under Siege: External and Internal Challenges", a paper submitted to the 
   international symposium on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, sponsored by the Japan Institute for 
   International Affairs, Center for Promoting Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, March 24, 2000, 
   Tokyo, Japan.
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their testing does not directly violate any legal obligations, it is contrary to the 
international norm accepted by overwhelming majority of states. The international 
society should not give them the status of nuclear-weapon states or other privileged 
status, as has been expressed many times, and should try to persuade them that 
testing was a loss, not gain. 
   In order to make India and Pakistan reverse their course, it is necessary for all 
states to take above-mentioned position, and to seek to improve security 
environment in South Asia. States should make every effort to promote 
negotiations and consultations between the two states, and in particular China 
should take positive initiatives for lessening tensions and building confidence 
because India feels nuclear threat from China. 
  The second issue is Israel that is in general believed to be only country to 
possess nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Since the last review conference of 
1995, all Arabic states acceded to the Treaty, and Israel is the only non-party to the 
Treaty in the region. At the Conference, the Subsidiary Body II was established 
under the Main committee II, and the issue of the Middle East was intensively 
discussed there. 
  The Conference, in the final document, reaffirms the importance of Israel's 
accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under 
comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference notes that the Disarmament 
Commission encouraged the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the 
Middle East, as well as the development of zones free from all weapons of mass 
destruction, and invites all states to reaffirm or declare their support for the 
objectives of establishing them. 
  The possibility that Israel will accede to the Treaty soon is very low, but states 
should make their best efforts to improve security circumstances in the Middle East 
by seriously continuing the peace process in the Middle East. As Israel has already 
signed the CTBT, international society should ask Israel to ratify it as soon as 
possible. 
2. Non-compliance and Securing Compliance 
  In the final document, the Conference, at the beginning, reaffirms that the full 
and effective implementation of the Treaty and the regime of non-proliferation i  
all its aspects has a vital role in promoting international peace and security. The 
Conference xpresses its concern with cases of non-compliance of the Treaty by 
states parties, and calls on those states non-compliant o move promptly to full 
compliance with their obligations.
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  On Iraqi issue, the Conference, by extending the duration of the Conference by 
one day, reaffirms the importance of Iraq's full continuous cooperation with the 
IAEA and compliance with its obligation. The U.S. argued that not only Articles I 
and II of the Treaty but also the Security Council resolutions directly relevant to 
nuclear non-proliferation had to be taken into account in discussing non-
compliance.51) On North Korea, the Conference, noting with concern that IAEA 
continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial 
declaration, looks forward to the fulfillment by the DPRK of its stated intention to 
come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with IAEA. 
  In connection with non-compliance and securing compliance, the IAEA has 
worked hard since 1993 to strengthen its safeguards ystem, and adopted a model 
protocol additional to the safeguards agreement in 1997. Although the states that 
ratified the model protocol are not many, through this method, in a longer term, 
nuclear activities of states will become more transparent, and the correctness and 
completeness of IAEA safeguards will improve, and compliance will be secured 
more reliably. 
  The states parties to the NPT, in general, have been very positive to react to 
non-compliance and strengthen the ways to secure compliance, and vast majority of 
states parties have been in compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. It can not 
be imagined that the issue of non-compliance will seriously deteriorate in the 
future. 
  There is the consensus of the importance of the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime, at least among the states parties to the Treaty. Vast majority 
of states is eagerly making efforts to deal with non-participation to the Treaty and 
non-compliance with the Treaty. The importance of the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime was strongly reaffirmed by the Conference. The regime will 
and can be strengthened more in the future.
VIII. The Prospect of Nuclear Disarmament
  The importance of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime has been 
described above. However, we must ask the legitimacy of the regime. Just as the 
Conference recalls in the final document, "the overwhelming majority of states 
entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the context, inter
51) NPT/CONF.2000/MC.UCRP.2, 2 May 2000.
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alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon 
states to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Treaty." Although the 
purpose of the NPT Review Conference is to review all provisions of the Treaty, 
the most important aspect of the works of the Conference is to review the progress 
in nuclear disarmament, and if not enough progress, to show the way to go. 
  The Conference examined whether and how the measures stipulated in the 
Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of 1995 
had been implemented. The CTBT was adopted in September 1996 and ratified by 
the United Kingdom, France and Russia, but its ratification was rejected in the U.S. 
Senate and China has not yet ratified it. The entry into force of the CTBT will take 
a long time. There have been almost no negotiations on a FMCT. The reasons are, 
on the one hand the issue of a linkage with the negotiation on nuclear disarmament, 
and on the other hand, the issue of how to deal with stockpiles. Negotiations on 
nuclear eduction between the U.S. and Russia stalled. 
  We can not be optimistic on the future prospect of nuclear disarmament. On the 
bilateral negotiations, the Russian Duma approved the ratification of the START II 
Treaty. This is a breakthrough and a big progress, but it contains many conditions 
including the strict compliance of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. ratified the START II 
Treaty in January 1996, but has not ratified the relevant agreements of September 
1997. The U.S. is neither ready to ratify the relevant agreements, nor ready to 
agree the conditions by Russia. As a result, the START II Treaty will not enter into 
force soon. Discussions on START III have been conducted between the two 
states, but negotiations are to start when the START II Treaty enters into force. 
  In the multilateral forum, the CD has not been working for almostfour years 
since it negotiated the CTBT in 1996. The 2000 NPT Review Conference suggests 
that a FMCT negotiations will not start soon, because the Conference urges the CD 
to agree on a programme of work including negotiations on a FMCT. The 
Conference permits the linkage of a FMCT with nuclear disarmament or prevention 
of arms race in outer space (PAROS). 
  In order to mobilize the CD, it is necessary that the U.S. and China or other 
nuclear-weapon states agree on negotiation agenda. That decision also has to take 
opinions of the non-nuclear-weapon states into account, because any decision in the 
CD is based on consensus. 
  The main reason why all nuclear disarmament negotiations talled is the U.S. 
program of the NMD. As it is clear from the discussions at the Conference, Russia, 
China and France are afraid that strategic stability will be jeopardized and their 
nuclear deterrence will not function. The relation between offensive weapons and
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defensive weapons has been discussed since 1960s, and the ABM Treaty has been 
believed to give the answer to their complex relation by providing a cornerstone for 
strategic stability. 
  In this sense, the U.S. program of the NMD is introducing a new paradigm to 
the complex strategic relation surrounding offensive and defensive weapons, and 
this can not be responded by the traditional nuclear strategy. We can not expect the 
progress in nuclear disarmament unless and until the solution, even if temporary, is 
found on the NMD issue. Accordingly, the early solution of the conflict on the 
NMD program is indispensable for the progress in nuclear disarmament. It will 
take some time to find out the solution, and this may give a negative impact on the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. 52)
52) On the analysis of the effect which the result of the Conference will give, See Taiiq Lauf, "AN 
   Unequivocal Success? Implications of the NPT Review Conference," Arms Control Today, 
   Vol.30,No.6, July/August 2000, pp.9-16: Rebecca Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A 
   Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise," Disarmament Diplomacy, No.46, May 2000, pp.2-21; Thomas 
   Graham, Jr., "Surviving the Storm: the NPT After the 2000 Review Conference," Disarmament 
   Diplomacy, No.46, May 2000, pp.22-25; Jayantha Dhanapala, "Eliminating Nuclear Arsenals: The NPT 
   Pledge and What It Means," Disarmament Diplomacy, No.47, July 2000, pp.3-6; Norman A. Wulf, 
   "Observations From the 2000 NPT Review Conference"
, Arms Control Today, Vol.30, No.9, November 
   2000, pp.3-9.
